Department of Commerce

University of Calcutta

Study Material

Cum

Lecture Notes

Only for the Students of M.Com. (Semester II)-2020

University of Calcutta

(Internal Circulation)

Dear Students,

Hope you, your parents and other family members are safe and secured. We are going through a world-wide crisis that seriously affects not only the normal life and economy but also the teaching-learning process of our University and our department is not an exception.

As the lock-down is continuing and it is not possible to reach you face to face class room teaching. Keeping in mind the present situation, our esteemed teachers are trying their level best to reach you through providing study material cum lecture notes of different subjects. This material is not an exhaustive one though it is an indicative so that you can understand different topics of different subjects. We believe that it is not the alternative of direct teaching learning.

It is a gentle request you to circulate this material only to your friends those who are studying in Semester II (2020).

Stay safe and stay home.

Best wishes.

Paper CC 202:

Managerial Economics (ME)

CC 202 ME: Managerial Economics

Unit 2 : Demand Theories and Applications

THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR

UTILITY, MARGINAL UTILITY AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP

Utility means satisfaction. Thus utility can be defined as the satisfaction derived from the consumption of commodities or services. In other words, utility is the want satisfying power of a commodity. Suppose I want to write something on the blackboard. So this is my want and the chalk has the power to satisfy this want. Hence we can say that using chalk on the blackboard in order to write something on it provides me utility. Since the chalk has the power to satisfy the want, hence the chalk is providing utility. Utility is often termed as total utility (TU). The unit of utility is Util.

On the otherhand marginal utility (MU) is defined as the change in the total utility due to one unit change in the consumption of the commodity. So MU depicts the change in total utility due to additional consumption. Naturally marginal utility is diminishing with the consumption of the more units of the same commodity. For example, if I watch a popular movie on Monday, it gives me a considerable amount of satisfaction. However if I will watch the same movie on Tuesday also, my total utility will increase but the degree of satisfaction will definitely come down since it was already seen by myself earlier. Now if I repeatedly watch the movie everyday, total utility will increase at a diminishing rate which is suggestive of diminishing marginal utility. However, this will continue upto a certain level of consumption. One point will come when the consumption of the additional unit start to reduce the total utility. In such case, marginal utility is negative. The relationship between Total and Marginal utility can be represented through the following chart.

Units consumed	Total Utility	Marginal Utility
0	0	
1	12	12
2	21	9

3	28	7
4	33	5
5	36	3
6	36	0
7	35	-1

Thus from the table it is evident that marginal utility is initially positive and diminishing, then it touches zero and becomes negative thereafter.

We can represent this relationship through figure-1. After analysing this figure 1, we can identify the following relationship between TU and MU.

- 1. When TU rises, MU is positive i.e. > 0
- 2. When TU is maximum and constant, MU =0
- 3. When TU falls, MU is negative i.e. < 0



DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO UTILITY

Generally there are two approaches to utility—cardinal and ordinal. Both of these approaches analyse utility in different manner. The cardinal utility theory says that utility is measurable just like prices and quantities. We can assign number of utils to each commodity in cardinal approach. In that sense it is a numerical and quantitative analysis. For example, if I say, that commodity 1 is providing me 20 utils of utility and commodity 2 is providing 25 utils of utility, then I am definitely following cardinal approach to utility. The economists who believed in cardinal approach, are of two types. One group believed that **utility is cardinal and additive**. Conversely the other group believed that **utility is cardinal but not additive**. Whatever may be the case, in cardinal approach both total utility and marginal utility is measurable.

In ordinal approach, the utility is not measurable like price and quantities. However we can order or rank the utility obtained from different commodities. Thus this approach is based on comparison and since here utility is not measurable, it is a qualitative analysis. For example if one says that one plate of biriyani is providing greater utility in comparison to one plate of fried rice, then obviously he is following ordinal approach to utility.

It should be noted that, in both of these approaches the assumption of diminishing marginal utility holds good.

Mathematically utility is a function of the quantity consumed of all the goods. Thus an utility function represents the mathematical relationship between the consumption of commodities and the utility obtained. It can be represented as—

 $U = U(x_1, x_2)$

Where, U = Utility obtained

- x_1 = units of commodity 1 consumed
- x₂ = units of commodity 2 consumed

ORDINAL APPROACH AND INDIFFERENCE CURVE

The modern theory of consumer behaviour, based on ordinal utility uses the technique of indifference curve (IC) in order to analyse the utility. IC is the locus of points or commodity combinations in the commodity-commodity space which give same utility to the consumer. Thus along an indifference curve, utility remains the same. Since along an IC, utility remains the same, hence IC is also known as Iso-utility curve.

In figure 2, there are three combinations of C-1 and C-2 which are represented by point A (Ox₁, Ox₂), B ($Ox_1^{'}, Ox_2^{'}$) and C ($Ox_1^{''}, Ox_2^{''}$). Let all these combinations give same utility to the consumer. Now if we take locus of all these combinations or add all these combinations like A, B and C we will get a negatively sloped curve, which is known as indifference curve. Here the IC is given by U. Thus all the points on U represent same amount of utility or satisfaction.



To analyse the indifference curve in ordinal analysis we should rest upon the following assumptions—

1. The consumer is rational who always tries to maximise own utility.

2. We consider a 2-commodity world in order to avoid complications related to multidimensional space

3. Utility is ordinally measurable which implies the different utility levels can be arranged in an order

4. Different utility levels are interdependent. Prepared by Dr Sujatra Bhattacharyya, Associate Professor of Economics 5. The transitivity relationship holds in case of indifference and preference. For instance if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then as per transitivity A will be preferred to C.

6. More is Better, which implies that higher the consumption of the commodity, greater will be the utility obtained.

- 7. Consumer's income is given and it is equal to the consumer's expenditure
- 8. Marginal rate of substitution is diminishing
- 9. Prices of the commodities are given.

PROPERTIES OF INDIFFERENCE CURVE

- 1. IC is negatively sloped.
- 2. Two ICs can never intersect each other
- 3. Higher IC provides greater utility
- 4. IC is convex to the origin.
- 5. All the points on an IC are indifferent in terms of utility

The property 5 is directly coming from definition. So there is no need to prove it. However we will prove the first four properties.

Property 1: IC is negatively sloped

In figure 3 the IC is represented by U where all the points on it represent same amount of utility.

Let the utility function is given by

 $U = U(x_1, x_2)$

Where, U = Utility obtained

 x_1 = units of commodity 1 consumed

 x_2 = units of commodity 2 consumed

Now differentiating both sides totally we have

 $dU = (\Delta U / \Delta x_1).dx_1 + (\Delta U / \Delta x_2).dx_2$

since along an IC the utility remains the same, hence dU =0

So, $(\Delta U/\Delta x_1).dx_1 = (\Delta U/\Delta x_1).dx_2$

Or, $dx_2/dx_1 = -(\Delta U/\Delta x_1)/(\Delta U/\Delta x_2)$

i.e. the slope of the IC = $dx_2/dx_1 = -(\Delta U/\Delta x_1)/(\Delta U/\Delta x_2)$

Now, $(\Delta U/\Delta x_1)$ is nothing but the marginal utility of C -1 and $(\Delta U/\Delta x_2)$ is marginal utility of C-2.

Thus the slope of IC = - $(MU_1/MU_2) < 0$

As both MU_1 , $MU_2 > 0$ hence the slope is negative.



Property 2: Two ICs can never intersect each other

Let initially we assume two ICs U_1 and U_2 intersect each other at point A, which is given in figure 4. We select a point 'B' on IC U_1 and a point 'C' on IC U_2 .

Initially when we consider U_1 , we observe that both point A and point B are on the same IC. So as per definition we can say that point A and point B are indifferent in terms of utility. Similarly

by considering IC U_{2} , we can say that point A and point C are same in terms of utility as per definition. So applying the rule of transitivity we can say that point B and C are indifferent in terms of utility as per definition. Thus according to the definition point B and point C provide same amount of utility.

Now if we look at the diagram, we observe at point B the consumer is able to consume Ox_1 units of C-1 and Ox_2 units of C -2, However at point C he can get $Ox_1^{'}$ (> Ox_1) units of C -1 and, $Ox_2^{'}$ (Ox_2) units of C-2. Thus point C involves higher consumption of both the commodities compared to point B. Since we know, more is better, according to the diagram we can conclude that point C should be preferred to point B as per utility is concerned.

Thus there arises a contradiction as diagram and definition are suggesting different result. This must be the result of our initial wrong assumption that two ICs can intersect each other.



So two ICs can never intersect each other.

Property 3: Higher IC provides greater utility:

Let there are two ICs— U_1 and U_2 among which U_2 is higher. These two ICs are represented in diagram 5. We select a point 'A' on U_1 and a point 'B' on U_2 . At A, the consumer is able to consume Ox_1 units of C-1 and Ox_2 units of C -2, However at point B, he can get $Ox_1^{'}$ (> Ox_1) units of C -1 and, $Ox_2^{'}$ (Ox_2) units of C-2. Thus point B involves higher consumption of both the commodities compared to point A. Since we know, more is better, according to the diagram we can conclude that point B should be preferred to point A as per utility is concerned.

Now as point B is preferred to point A in terms of utility, all the points on U_2 are preferred to all the points on U_1 as per utility is concerned. Hence clearly U_2 , which is the higher IC, depicts greater utility compared to U_1

Hence, higher IC provides greater utility.



Property 4: ICs are convex to the origin

A curve is said to be convex to the origin if a tangent drawn through any point on it is below the curve. Conversely in case of a curve which is concave to the origin, tangent drawn through any point of that curve should be over the curve.

However in order to prove the convexity of the IC, we should discuss the concept of Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) first. MRS measures the units of one commodity that has to be sacrificed in order to get one extra unit of the other commodity so that total utility remains constant. Now **if we can show that MRS is diminishing, then we can safely conclude that IC will be convex to the origin**.

In diagram 6, U is the relevant IC and the consumer initially stays at point 'A' where he is getting 1 unit of C-1 and Ox_2 units of C -2. Now in order to consume an additional unit of C-1, the consumer moves from A to B along the same IC where he can get 2 units of C -1 and $Ox_2^{'}$ units of C-2. Here—

 $MRS_{A->B} = I (Ox_2' - Ox_2)/(2-1)I = I x_2x_2' I$

Similarly if the consumer again wants to consume an additional unit of C-1, he will move from B to C along the same IC where we can get 3 units of C -1 and $Ox_2^{"}$ units of C-2. Here—

$$MRS_{B->C} = I (Ox_2'' - Ox_2')/(2-1)I = I x_2' x_2'' I$$

From the diagram, it is evident that $|x_2' x_2''| < |x_2x_2'|$ i.e. MRS is falling.

The diminishing MRS ensures the convexity of the IC.

So IC is convex to the origin.

It should be noted that, we can also show that when MRS is constant then IC will be a negatively sloped straight line. In addition to this, if MRS is increasing IC will be concave to the origin.



BUDGET LINE:

Budget line is the locus of the points or combinations of the commodities which represent same expenditure. Thus along the budget line consumer's expenditure is constant. In our analysis we assume that consumer's income is fixed and it is also equal to consumer's expenditure. Hence the budget line not only represents the fixed income or the expenditure of the consumer but also the equality between consumer's income and expenditure. Since the income of the consumer and the expenditure are equal, a consumer has to stay on the budget line. The consumer can not cross it or can not remain inside it. Any point above the budget line indicates the excees of expenditure over income. Conversely any point inside the budget lien indicates

the exces of income over expenditure. In our analysis both of these abovementioned possibilities are assumed to be ruled out.

The budget line is a negatively sloped straight line.

Equation of a budget line

Let the consumer's fixed income is given by M. Let the consumer consumes two commodities— C-1 and C-2. Let the price of 1 unit of C-1 and 1 unit of C-2 are given by P₁ and P₂ respectively. We assume the consumer is consuming X₁ units of C-1 and X₂ units of C-2. Hence the total expenditure of the consumer is given by (P₁X₁ + P₂X₂)

Now since the budget line represents the equality between consumer's income and expenditure, the equation of the budget line is

 $\mathsf{M} = \mathsf{P}_1 \mathsf{X}_1 + \mathsf{P}_2 \mathsf{X}_2$

Construction of the budget line

Let consumer's income (M) = Rs 100, Price of C-1 (P_1) = Rs 5, Price of C-2 (P_2) = Rs 10.

Now here we will mention some of the combinations of C-1 and C-2 for which the expenditure and income are equal i.e. expenditure should be equal to 100.

C-1	C-2
20	0
0	10
10	5
8	6
6	7
4	8
12	4

All the above mentioned combinations of C-1 and C-2 are different but they are similar in one respect. All of these combinations are suggestive of same expenditure i.e. 100. If we add all these combinations viz. (20, 0), (0, 20), (10, 5), (8, 6), (6, 7), (4, 8), and (12, 4) then we will get the budget line which is represented in figure 7.



Slope and the intercept of the budget line

Let the budget line in figure 8 is given by AB.

The slope of the budget line is $\tan \theta = OA/OB$(1)

Now if the consumer stays at point A, he can consume zero unit (0) of C-1 and OA units of C-2. So his budget equation becomes-

 $M = P_1.0 + P_2. OA$

So, OA= M/P₂.....(2)

Conversely if the consumer stays at point B, he can consume OB units of C-1 and zero (0) unit of C-2. Then his budget equation becomes—

 $M = P_1. OB + P_2.0$

So, OB = M/P₁.....(3)

From (1), the slope of the budget line = $OA/OB = - (M/P_2)/(M/P_1)$

 $= - P_1/P_2$

Here the negative sign is inserted before the expression as there exists an inverse relationship between the consumption of C-1 and C-2.

So slope of the budget line is $(-P_1/P_2) = IP_1/P_2I$



We can also determine the slope of the budget line mathematically.

We know the budget equation is given by-

- $\mathsf{M} = \mathsf{P}_1\mathsf{X}_1 + \mathsf{P}_2\mathsf{X}_2$
- Or, $P_2X_2 = M P_1X_1$
- Or, $X_2 = (M P_1X_1)/P_2$

Or,
$$X_2 = M/P_2 - (P_1/P_2)$$
. X_1

Or,
$$X_2 = -(P_1/P_2)$$
. $X_1 + M/P_2$

This is the equation of a straight line which is in the form of y=mx + c, whose slope

(m) = - (P_1/P_2) and vertical intercept (c) = M/ P_2

So the slope of the budget line is given by $(-P_1/P_2) = IP_1/P_2I$

The vertical intercept (OA) = M/P_2

The horizontal intercept (OB) = M/P_1

Shift and rotation of the budget line

The budget equation is given by

$\mathsf{M} = \mathsf{P}_1 \mathsf{X}_1 + \mathsf{P}_2 \mathsf{X}_2$

Here, income and prices are constant, however the combinations of commodities vary. Now if there is a change in the income level or the prices the budget line will either shift or rotate. If there is no common point between the old and the new budget line then we can term it as the shift, where as if there is a common point between the old and the new budget line, then we can call it as the rotation of the budget line.

In figure 9, income (M) changes and prices i.e. P_1 and P_2 remain same. Thus both the vertical and horizontal intercepts M/P_2 and M/P_1 will rise, which implies an upward shift of the budget line. Now we know slope of the budget line is given by = IP_1/P_2I = Modulus P_1/P_2 . Since here both prices remain same, the slope will be unchanged. This suggests that if M increases and P_1 and P_2 remain same, then there will be an upward parallel shift of the budget line from AB to A'B'.



In figure 10, we assume income (M) and price of C-2 i.e. P_2 remain fixed but there is a fall in the price of C-1 i.e. P_1 .

This implies the vertical intercept (M/P_2) remains same, however the horizontal intercept (M/P_1) rises due to the fall in the denominator part i.e. P_1 . So here the old budget line AB will rotate rightward to AC.

We can consider various rotations and shifts of budget line by altering the conditions.



CONSUMER EQUILIBRIUM

A consumer is said to be in equilibrium if he attains maximum possible satisfaction or utility from his purchases of commodities subject to the budget constraint. Thus a consumer always tries to maximise utility with his given income. We know indifference curve (IC) indicates the utility level and the budget line represents the fixed income of the consumer. The objective of the consumer is to reach the highest possible IC remaining on the budget line. Here we assume that

In figure 11, U_0 , U_1 , U_2 , U_3 and U_4 are five representative ICs among which U_4 is the highest. The consumer's fixed income is given by the budget line AB. We know the consumer has to stay on the budget line. Now, among the representative ICs, the consumer can not reach U_3 and U_4 , since they are beyond his budget line. Thus he has to choose among the points K, L, M, N and E. It is clear from the diagram that the consumer will definitely choose point E as it is on a relatively higher IC U_2 , compared to K or L (on U_0) and M or N (on U_1). So in this circumstance point E provides the consumer with maximum possible utility. So point E is known as consumer's equilibrium point.

We can easily identify the conditions of consumer's equilibrium. In the diagram IC U_2 is drawn in such a way so that the budget line AB is tangent to it at point E. Thus the slope of IC U_2 at E can be measured by the slope of the tangent AB through E. Here the budget line is acting as the tangent. Thus the conditions of equilibrium can be given as-

At the point of equilibrium,

1. Slope of IC = Slope of budget line

Or, $-(MU_1/MU_2) = -(P_1/P_2)$

Or, $MU_1 / P_1 = MU_2 / P_2$

i.e utility of Re 1 worth of C-1 is equal to utility of Re 1 worth of C-2 at the point of equilibrium.

2. Since both C-1 and C-2 are good commodities, the relevant IC should be convex to the origin.

As point E refers to the point of equilibrium of the consumer, it can be understood from the diagram that if the consumer purchases Ox_1 units of C-1 and Ox_2 units of C-2 then he will be in the equilibrium. Ox_1 units of C-1 and Ox_2 units of C-2 are known as the optimal purchases or the optimal demand functions of the consumer.



ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONDITION OF CONSUMER EQUILIBRIUM

Here we will discuss the economic interpretation of the consumer's equilibrium condition. Here we will show why point E can be termed as the equilibrium point. For this we select two different points M and N to the left and right of point E respectively on the same budget line AB. This is depicted in figure 12.

At point M, the slope of IC can be measured by the slope of the tangent ST through it. Thus at M, slope of IC (STO) > slope of budget line (ABO). So at M, $(MU_1/MU_2) > (P_1/P_2)$

Or, $MU_1/P_1 > MU_2/P_2$ Prepared by Dr Sujatra Bhattacharyya, Associate Professor of Economics Hence at M, the utility of Re 1 worth of C-1 is greater than that of C-2. So here the consumer will try to consume more of C-1 at the expense of C-2 in order to raise the utility level. Thus here the consumer will move down right towards E along the same budget line AB in order to get more C-1 by sacrificing C-2.

Conversely, At point N, the slope of IC can be measured by the slope of the tangent UV through it. Thus at N, slope of IC (UVO) < slope of budget line (ABO). So at N, $(MU_1/MU_2) < (P_1/P_2)$

Or, $MU_1/P_1 < MU_2/P_2$

Hence at N, the utility of Re 1 worth of C-2 is greater than that of C-1. So here the consumer will try to consume more of C-2 at the expense of C-1 in order to raise the utility level. Thus here the consumer will move up left towards E along the same budget line AB in order to get more C-2 by sacrificing C-1.

Finally he will settle at point E, where the slope of IC and the slope of budget line are equal, i.e. utility of Re 1 worth of C-1 is equal to the utility of Re 1 worth of C-2. Thus the point of equilibrium is nothing but a state of rest. At E, since the consumer is getting same amount of utility by spending Re 1 on both the commodities, there will be no tendency from the part of him to shift from that point. Hence point E is the equilibrium point of the consumer.



CC 202 ME: Managerial Economics

MODULE—I

[Prepared by-Dr. Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay]

Constrained optimization problem:

This study material tries to show how to solve the constrained optimization problem. In the case of constrained optimization problem, we have to maximize/minimize the objective function subject to the given constraint.

Suppose, our problem is to maximize $Y = f(x_1, x_2)$ subject to $K = a_1x_1 + a_2x_2$, where K, a_1, a_2 are constant. We can solve the problem by using the Lagrangean method. Actually, the Lagrangean method converts the constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained one.

The Lagrangean expression is

$$L = f(x_1, x_2) + \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} K - a_1 x_1 - a_2 x_2 \end{bmatrix} \right\}$$

Where $\} > 0$ and $\}$ is the Lagrange Multiplier.

The first order conditions for this optimization problem are

$$L_{1} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{1}} = f_{1} - a_{1} = 0 \quad (1)$$

$$L_{2} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{2}} = f_{2} - a_{2} = 0 \quad (2)$$

$$L_{3} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{3}} = K - a_{1}x_{1} - a_{2}x_{2} = 0 \quad (3)$$

From (1) and (2) we get,

$\frac{f_1}{1}$ =	f_2	(4
a_1	^a 2	× ×

From (3) we get,

 $K = a_1 x_1 + a_2 x_2$ (5)

Solving (4) and (5) we get the optimum values of x_1, x_2 as

$$x_{1}^{*} = x_{1}^{*} \left(a_{1}, a_{2}, K \right)$$
$$x_{2}^{*} = x_{2}^{*} \left(a_{1}, a_{2}, K \right)$$

The second Order Condition for Y maximization is $|\overline{H}| > 0$. That means the value of the bordered Hessian Determinant is greater than zero.

Now,
$$|\overline{H}| = \begin{vmatrix} L_{11} & L_{21} & L_{11} \\ L_{12} & L_{22} & L_{12} \\ L_{11} & L_{22} & L_{12} \\ L_{11} & L_{22} & L_{12} \end{vmatrix}$$

Using Equations (1),(2), (3) we can write,

 $\left|\overline{H}\right| = \begin{vmatrix} f_{11} & f_{21} & -a_1 \\ f_{12} & f_{22} & -a_2 \\ -a_1 & -a_2 & 0 \end{vmatrix} > 0$ (all second partials are evaluated at the optimum values of choice

variables)

So, the optimum values of the choice variables give the maximum values of the objective function.

Note that for maximization problem the Bordered Hessian Determinant must be negative.

Now, let us solve a problem.

U = xy **Max.** $S.T.M = xP_x + yP_y$

The Lagrangean expression is $L = xy + \left\{ M - xP_x - yP_y \right\}$

where $\} > 0$ and it is the Lagrange multiplier.

The F.O.C.s are:

 $L_x = y - P_x = 0$ (1)

$$L_{y} = x - P_{y} = 0$$
 (2)
$$L_{z} = M - xP_{x} - yP_{y} = 0$$
 (3)

From (1) and (2) we get,

$$\frac{y}{P_x} = \frac{x}{P_y} \Longrightarrow xP_x = yP_y (4)$$

Using (3) and (4) we get,

$$x^* = \frac{M}{2P_x}$$
$$y^* = \frac{M}{2P_y}$$

These are the demand functions for x and y.

The S.O.C. is $|\bar{H}| > 0$.

Here,
$$|\bar{H}| = \begin{vmatrix} L_{xx} & L_{yx} & L_{y} \\ L_{xy} & L_{yy} & L_{y} \\ L_{x} & L_{y} & L_{y} \end{vmatrix} = \begin{vmatrix} 0 & 1 & -P_{x} \\ 1 & 0 & -P_{y} \\ -P_{x} & -P_{y} & 0 \end{vmatrix} = 2P_{x}P_{y} > 0$$
 (at the optimum values of x and y)

Thus the SOC is satisfied and the optimum level of purchase of the two goods are

$$x^* = \frac{M}{2P_x}, y^* = \frac{M}{2P_y}$$

Remarks:

1.

$$x^* = \frac{M}{2P_x}, y^* = \frac{M}{2P_y}$$
$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial P_x} = -\frac{M}{2P_x^2} < 0$$
$$\frac{\partial y^*}{\partial P_y} = -\frac{M}{2P_y^2} < 0$$

This implies that the demand curves are negatively sloped.

2. The price elasticity of demand is unit for both of the two goods. This implies that the demand curves are rectangular hyperbolic.

Home Work:

Given
$$U = (x+2)(y+1), P_x = 2, P_y = 5, M = 51.$$

a. Write the Lagrangean function.

b. Find the optimal levels of purchase of x and y.

c. Is the second-order condition for maximum fulfilled?

CC 202 ME: Managerial Economics

Module –I

Unit: 3 Production and Cost

(Prepared by Dr. Mahananda Kanjilal and Anindita Basu)

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Theory of Production

(a) Maximise profit Π , subject to a cost constraint. In this case total cost and prices (a) Maximise profit Π , subject to a cost constraint. In this case total cost and prices are given $(\overline{C}, \overline{w}, \overline{r}, \overline{P}_x)$, and the problem may be stated as follows

$$\max \Pi = R - \overline{C} \\ \Pi = \overline{P}_x X - \overline{C}$$

Clearly maximisation of Π is achieved in this case if X is maximised, since \overline{C} and \overline{P}_x are given constants by assumption.

are given contactor to build a bridge (X is given) with the maximum profit. In this case we have

$$\max \Pi = R - C$$
$$\Pi = \overline{P}_x \overline{X} - C$$

Clearly maximisation of Π is achieved in this case if cost C is minimised, given that X and P_x are given constants by assumption.

The analysis will be carried out first by using diagrams and subsequently by applying calculus.

For a graphical presentation of the equilibrium of the firm (its profit-maximising position) we will use the isoquant map (figure 3.32) and the isocost-line(s) (figure 3.33).



The isoquants have been explained in section I, where it was shown that the slope of an isoquant is

$$-\frac{\partial K}{\partial L} = MRS_{L,K} = \frac{MP_L}{MP_K} = \frac{\partial X/\partial L}{\partial X/\partial K}$$

The isocost line is defined by the cost equation

C = (r)(K) + (w)(L)

where w = wage rate, and r = price of capital services.

The isocost line is the locus of all combinations of factors the firm can purchase with a given monetary cost outlay.¹

The slope of the isocost line is equal to the ratio of the prices of the factors of production:

slope of isocost line =
$$\frac{w}{r}$$

¹ There is a close analogy between the consumer's budget line (Chapter 2, figure 2.10) and the firm's isocost line.

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Proof

Assume that the total cost outlay the firm undertakes is \overline{C} . If the entrepreneur spends all the amount \overline{C} on capital equipment, the maximum amount he can buy from this factor is

$$0A = \frac{\overline{C}}{r}$$

If all cost outlay is spent on labour the maximum amount of this factor that the firm $c_{an pur}$, chase is

$$0B = \frac{C}{w}$$

The slope of the isocost line is

$$\frac{0A}{0B} = \frac{\overline{C}/r}{\overline{C}/w} = \frac{w}{r}$$

It can be shown that any point on the line AB satisfies the cost equation $(C = r \cdot K_{+} w \cdot L)$, so that, for given prices of the factors and for given expenditure on them, the isocost line shows the alternative combinations of K and L that can be purchased by the firm. The equation of the isocost line is found by solving the cost equation for K:

$$K = \frac{C}{r} - \frac{w}{r}L$$

By assigning various values to L we can find all the points of the isocost line.

Case 1: maximisation of output subject to a cost constraint (financial constraint)

We assume: (a) A given production function

$$X = f(L, K, v, \gamma)$$

and (b) given factor prices, w, r, for labour and capital respectively.

The firm is in equilibrium when it maximizes its output given its total cost outlay and the prices of the factors, w and r.

In figure 3.34 we see that the maximum level of output the firm can produce, given the cost constraint, is X_2 defined by the tangency of the isocost line, and the highest isoquant. The optimal combination of factors of production is K_2 and L_2 , for prices w and r. Higher levels of output (to the right of e) are desirable but not attainable due





= w

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Theory of Production

to the cost constraint. Other points on AB or below it lie on a lower isoquant than X_2 . Hence X_2 is the maximum output possible under the above assumptions (of given cost outlay, given production function, and given factor prices). At the point of tangency (e) the slope of the isocost line (w/r) is equal to the slope of the isoquant (MP_L/MP_K) . This constitutes the first condition for equilibrium. The second condition is that the isoquants be convex to the origin. In summary: the conditions for equilibrium of the firm are:

(a) Slope of isoquant = Slope of isocost

or

$$\frac{w}{r} = \frac{MP_L}{MP_K} = \frac{\partial X/\partial L}{\partial X/\partial K} = MRS_{L,K}$$

(b) The isoquants must be convex to the origin. If the isoquant is concave the point of tangency of the isocost and the isoquant curves does not define an equilibrium position (figure 3.35).



Output X_2 (depicted by the concave isoquant) can be produced with lower cost at e_2 which lies on a lower isocost curve than e_2 (With a concave isoquant we have a 'corne solution.)

Formal derivation of the equilibrium conditions

The equilibrium conditions may be obtained by applying calculus and solving a 'constrain maximum' problem which may be stated as follows. The rational entrepreneur seeks the ma misation of his output, given his total-cost outlay and the prices of factors. Formally:

Maximise	X = f(L, K)
----------	-------------

subject to $\bar{C} = wL + rK$ (cost constraint)

This is a problem of constrained maximum and the above conditions for the equilibrium of t firm may be obtained from its solution.

We can solve this problem by using Lagrangian multipliers. The solution involves the followi steps:

Rewrite the constraint in the form

$$\bar{C} - wL - rK = 0$$

Multiply the constraint by a constant λ which is the Lagrangian multiplier:

$$\lambda(\bar{C} - wL - rK) = 0$$

The Lagrangian multipliers are undefined constants which are used for solving constrain maxima or minima. Their value is determined simultaneously with the values of the oth

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unknowns (L and K in our example). There will be as many Lagrangian multipliers as there a_{re} constraints in the problem.

Form the 'composite' function

$$\mathbf{v} + \lambda (\mathbf{C} - \mathbf{w} \mathbf{L} - \mathbf{r} \mathbf{K})$$

It can be shown that maximisation of the ϕ function implies maximisation of the output. can be shown that maximisation of the ϕ function implies interval derivatives be equal to the first condition for the maximisation of a function is that its partial derivatives be equal to the first condition for the above function with respect to L, K and λ are: The first condition for the maximisation of a function is the respect to L, K and λ are: zero. The partial derivatives of the above function with respect to L, K and λ are:

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial L} = \frac{\partial X}{\partial L} + \lambda(-w) = 0 \tag{3.1}$$

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial K} = \frac{\partial X}{\partial K} + \lambda(-r) = 0 \tag{3.2}$$

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \lambda} = \bar{C} - wL - rK = 0 \tag{3.3}$$

Solving the first two equations for λ we obtain

$$\frac{\partial X}{\partial L} = \lambda w \quad \text{or} \quad \lambda = \frac{\partial X/\partial L}{w} = \frac{MP_L}{w}$$
$$\frac{\partial X}{\partial K} = \lambda r \quad \text{or} \quad \lambda = \frac{\partial X/\partial K}{r} = \frac{MP_K}{r}$$

The two expressions must be equal; thus

$$\frac{\partial X/\partial L}{W} = \frac{\partial X/\partial K}{r} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{MP_L}{MP_K} = \frac{\partial X/\partial L}{\partial X/\partial K} = \frac{W}{r}$$

This firm is in equilibrium when it equates the ratio of the marginal productivities of factors to the ratio of their prices.

It can be shown¹ that the second-order conditions for equilibrium of the firm require that the marginal product curves of the two factors have a negative slope.

The slope of the marginal product curve of labour is the second derivative of the production function:

slope of
$$MP_L$$
 curve $= \frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L^2}$

Similarly for capital:

slope of
$$MP_{K}$$
 curve $= \frac{\partial^{2} X}{\partial K^{2}}$

The second-order conditions are

$$\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L^2} < 0$$
 and $\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial K^2} < 0$

artel and at late

and

$$\left(\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L^2}\right)\left(\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial K^2}\right) > \left(\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L \partial K}\right)^2$$

These conditions are sufficient for establishing the convexity of the isoquants. erations adjutes without the output ¹ See Henderson and Quandt, Microeconomic Theory (McGraw-Hill, 1958) pp. 49-54.



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C_{ase} 2: minimisation of cost for a given level of output

The conditions for equilibrium of the firm are formally the same as in Case 1. That is, The conditions for equilibrium of the firm are formally the same as in Case 1. That is, there must be tangency of the (given) isoquant and the lowest possible isocost curve, and the isoquant must be convex. However, the problem is conceptually different in the and the isoquant minimisation. The entrepreneur wants to produce a given output (for case of cost minimisation. The entrepreneur wants to produce a given output (for example, a bridge, a building, or \overline{X} tons of a commodity) with the minimum cost outlay. In this case we have a single isoquant (figure 3.36) which denotes the desired level of

In this case we have a set of isocost curves (figure 3.37). Curves closer to the origin show output, but we have a set of isocost curves (figure 3.37). Curves closer to the origin show a lower total-cost outlay. The isocost lines are parallel because they are drawn on the assumption of constant prices of factors: since w and r do not change, all the isocost curves have the same slope w/r.



The firm minimises its costs by employing the combination of K and L determined by the point of tangency of the \overline{X} isoquant with the lowest isocost line (figure 3.38). Points below *e* are desirable because they show lower cost but are not attainable for output \overline{X} . Points above *e* show higher costs. Hence point *e* is the least-cost point, the point denoting the least-cost combination of the factors K and L for producing \overline{X} .

point denoting the least-cost combination of the lactors it and 2 for producing it. Clearly the conditions for equilibrium (least cost) are the same as in Case 1, that is, equality of the slopes of the isoquant and the isocost curves, and convexity of the isoquant.



Formally: Minimise subject to Rewrite the constraint in the form X = f(L, K)X = f(L, K) = 0 Premultiply the constraint by the Lagrangian multiplier λ $\lambda(\bar{X} - f(L, K)) = 0$

Form the 'composite' function $\phi = C - \lambda [\overline{X} - f(L, K)]$

or

 $\phi = (wL + rK) - \lambda [\overline{X} - f(L, K)]$

 $f \neq with respect to L, K and \lambda and equate to zero:$

Take the partial derivatives of
$$\phi$$
 with respectively $\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial L} = w - \lambda \frac{\partial f(L, K)}{\partial L} = 0 = w - \lambda \frac{\partial X}{\partial L}$
$$\frac{\partial \phi}{K} = r - \lambda \frac{\partial f(L, K)}{\partial K} = 0 = r - \lambda \frac{\partial X}{\partial K}$$
$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \lambda} = - [\overline{X} - f(L, K)] = 0$$

From the first two expressions we obtain

$$w = \lambda \frac{\partial X}{\partial L}$$
$$r = \lambda \frac{\partial X}{\partial K}$$

Dividing through these expressions we find

$$\frac{w}{r} = \frac{\partial X / \partial L}{\partial X / \partial K} = MRS_{L, K}$$

This condition is the same as in Case 1 above. The second (sufficient) condition, concerning the convexity of the isoquant, is fulfilled by the assumption of negative slopes of the marginal product of factors as in Case 1, that is

$$\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L^2} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial K^2} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \left(\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L^2}\right) \left(\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial K^2}\right) > \left(\frac{\partial^2 X}{\partial L \partial K}\right)$$

B. CHOICE OF OPTIMAL EXPANSION PATH

We distinguish two cases: expansion of output with all factors variable (the long run), and expansion of output with some factor(s) constant (the short run).

Optimal expansion path in the long run

In the long run all factors of production are variable. There is no limitation (technical or financial) to the expansion of output. The firm's objective is the choice of the optimal way of expanding its output, so as tc maximise its profits. With given factor prices (w, r)and given production function, the optimal expansion path is determined by the points of tangency of successive isocost lines and successive isoquants.

If the production function is homogeneous the expansion path will be a straight line through the origin, whose slope (which determines the optimal K/L ratio) depends on the ratio of the factor of the ratio of the factor prices. In figure 3.39 the optimal expansion path will be 0A,



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defined by the locus of points of tangency of the isoquants with successive parallel defined with a slope of w/r. If the ratio of th defined by the slope of w/r. If the ratio of the prices increases the isocost lines isocost lines with a slope of w'/r. isocost fines increases the isocost lines become flatter (for example, with a slope of w'/r'), and the optimal expansion path will become flatter (for example, of course if the ratio of size is t become matter line 0B. Of course, if the ratio of prices of factors was initially w/r and be the straight line 0B. Of course, if the expansion rate of factors was initially w/r and be the straight changes to w'/r', the expansion path changes: initially w/r and subsequently changes to w'/r', the factor prices it must be first of the first moves subsequences along 0A, but after the change in the factor prices it moves along 0B.

If the production function is non-homogeneous the optimal expansion path will not be a straight line, even if the ratio of prices of factors remains constant. This is shown in be a strange constant. This is snown in figure 3.40. It is due to the fact that in equilibrium we must equate the (constant) w/rignite state $MRS_{L,K}$, which is the same on a curved isocline (see section II).

Optimal expansion path in the short run

In the short run, capital is constant and the firm is coerced to expand along a straight line parallel to the axis on which we measure the variable factor L. With the prices of factors constant the firm does not maximise its profits in the short run, due to the constraint of the given capital. This situation is shown in figure 3.41. The optimal expansion path would be 0A were it possible to increase K. Given the capital equip-

ment, the firm can expand only along $\overline{K}\overline{K}$ in the short run. The above discussion of the choice of optimal combination of the factors of production

is schematically summarised on p. 94.



Theory of Production

plotting these points on a two-dimensional diagram with TC on the vertical axis and V on the horizontal axis, we obtain the total-cost curve (for vertical axis and plotting these points are point of the point of the point of the point of the point (X) on the horizontal axis, we obtain the total-cost curve (figure 3.43). With our output (X) of constant returns to scale and of constant factor prices of the point output (A) on the formation of constant returns to scale and of constant factor prices) the AC is constant assumption (of output), hence the AC will be a straight line prosterior of output). assumption (c) constant factor prices) the AC is constant (£1.50 per 'unit' of output), hence the AC will be a straight line, parallel to the horizontal (£1.50 per 'unit' of output). It is important to remember that the cost own axis (light of choice of the optimal (least-cost) technique has been solved at a previous stage. In other words, the complex problem of finding the cheapest combination of factor inputs must be solved before the cost curve is defined.



B. FORMAL DERIVATION OF COST CURVES FROM A PRODUCTION FUNCTION

In applied research one of the most commonly used forms of production function is the Cobb-Douglas form

$$X = b_0 L^{b_1} K^{b_2}$$

Given this production function and the cost equation

$$C = wL + rK$$

we want to derive the cost function, that is, the total cost as a function of output

$$C = f(X)$$

We begin by solving the constrained output maximisation problem:

Maximise

 $X = b_0 L^{b_1} K^{b_2}$ $\bar{C} = wL + rK$ (cost constraint)

(The bar on top of C has the meaning that the firm has a given amount of money to spend on both factors of production.) We form the 'composite' function $\phi = X + \lambda (\bar{C} - wL - rK)$

where $\lambda = \text{Lagrangian multiplier}$

The first condition for maximisation is that the first derivatives of the function with respect to L, K and λ be equal to zero: (2 1)

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial L} = b_1 \frac{X}{L} - \lambda w = 0$$
(3.5)

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial K} = b_2 \frac{\Lambda}{K} - \lambda r = 0 \tag{3.6}$$

$$\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial \lambda} = (C - wL - rK) = 0$$

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(3.7)

(3.8)

(3.9)

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From equations 3.4 and 3.5 we obtain

$$b_1 \frac{X}{L} = \lambda w$$
 and $b_2 \frac{X}{K} = \lambda v$

Dividing these expressions we obtain

$$\frac{b_1}{b_2} \cdot \frac{K}{L} = \frac{w}{r}$$

Solving for K

$$K = \frac{w}{r} \cdot \frac{b_2}{b_1} L$$

Substituting K into the production function we obtain

$$X = b_0 L^{b_1} K^{b_2}$$
$$X = b_0 L^{b_1} \left[\frac{w}{r} \frac{b_2}{b_1} L \right]^{b_2}$$
$$X = b_0 \left[\left(\frac{w}{r} \right) \left(\frac{b_2}{b_1} \right) \right]^{b_2} L^{(b_1 + b_2)}$$

The term in brackets is the constant term of the function: it includes the three coefficients of the production function, b_0 , b_1 , b_2 , and the prices of the factors of production. Solving the above form of the production function for L, we find

$$\frac{1}{b_0 \left(\frac{w}{r} \frac{b_2}{b_1}\right)^{b_2}} X = L^{(b_1 + b_2)}$$

or

$$\left[\frac{1}{b_0\left(\frac{w}{r}\frac{b_2}{b_1}\right)^{b_2}} \cdot X\right]^{1/(b_1+b_2)} = h$$

or

(a.C)

$$L = \left(\frac{rb_1}{wb_2}\right)^{b_2/(b_1 + b_2)} \left(\frac{X}{b_0}\right)^{1/(b_1 + b_2)}$$

Substituting the value of L from expression 3.8 into expression 3.7 for capital we obtain

 $K = \frac{w}{r} \cdot \frac{b_2}{b_1} L$ $K = \left(\frac{wb_2}{rb_1}\right)^{1/(b_1 + b_2)} \left(\frac{X}{b_0}\right)^{1/(b_1 + b_2)}$

Substituting expression 3.8 and 3.9 into the cost equation C = wL + rK we find

$$C = \left(\frac{1}{b_0}\right)^{1/(b_1 + b_2)} \left[w\left(\frac{rb_1}{wb_2}\right)^{b_2/(b_1 + b_2)} + r\left(\frac{wb_2}{rb_1}\right)^{b_1/(b_1 + b_2)}\right] \cdot X^{1/(b_1 + b_2)}$$

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Some mathematical Application on Cost of Production. 1. let a firm has SRTC = q3- 10q2+179+66. 9. P=5, find I at which it maximises profil. Also Calculate The output elasticity of cast at this output. Ans: We know that TI = TR-TC = 59 - (93-1093+179+66) Now for F.O.C. (2020) TI maximisation $\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial q} = 0$ => 3q²- 20q+12=0 : q = 6, $\frac{2}{3}$, At q = 6, $\frac{\partial^2 T}{\partial q^2} = -16 < 0$ Profit maximising output is 6. Output elasticity of cost - 29 . C $= \frac{AC}{MC}$ At Q = 6, AC = $Q^2 - 10Q + 17 + \frac{66}{9}$:. Butput elenticity - 4 = 0.8. 2. let Production fun is $G = K^{\frac{1}{2}}L^{\frac{1}{2}}$ and Cost function. is C = rK + WL. Find out cost function. The equation of expansion Path is. MPL = W $\Rightarrow K = \frac{W}{r}L + L = \frac{\gamma}{W}K$ · Q = (W L) + K-1 $: L = \sqrt{\frac{1}{10}} \cdot g , \quad K = \sqrt{\frac{10}{10}} \cdot g .$ 2 wr a This is the eimplified version of Cost functions which is straight line through the origin with slope 2100.

CC 202 ME: Managerial Economics

Module –II

Unit 5 : Risk and Uncertainties in Managerial

Decision Making

(Dr. Samarpita Seth)

Paper cc 202: Managerial Economics Module II Topic 5: Rista and Uncertainties in Managerial Decision Making A) concepts of Lottery, definitions and features of Expected Utility Function (also called. VNM Utility functions) are discussed in the class. Ref: Microeconomic Analysis. Hal. R. Varian. Préférence Towards, Rista. Ref: Microeconomics Pindyck, Rubinfeld and Mehta Reople differ in their beillingnen to bear risk. Some are rista & averse, some aire rista lover and some are rista mentral. Jo understand. difference in risk bearing we start ceitre an example Suppose a consinuer has an income As 15,000 and the is considering a nehe but risby job. with two alternative. (1) RS. 30,000 with probability 0.5 (2) Ry 10,000 with probability 0.5. Naturally we can calculate enpected to Income of the future job as follows Scanned with CamScanner

0.5.(30,000) + 0.5(10,000) = Rs. 20,000. clearly as ps 20,000 > ps 15,000, the consumer will accept the risby job. by leaving her present certain Vincome if she is hista lover. If she is kista avorse then she will prefer to stay on -event job. And she will, be a indiff -erent between present and future, job if she is risk neutral. The same conclusion can by interpreted. with the help of following diag -D- ELS OWOT emergined of Uniury 18_ -F Michaelerandite 31 to he wide A Risk Averse 10,000 20,000 30,000 Tall interfib 21,000 some and sister & averific 15,000 fig 1. Fig1 enplained the above example. Fig1. emploiment $\Psi(\text{intere 10,000}) = 10^{\circ}(\text{point }A)$. Suppose We assure $\Psi(\text{intere 10,000}) = 18^{\circ}(\text{point }A)$. Hence 1.10 + 1/18 = 14 (point F) Hence. clearly point B corresponds to the ubility of certain present in come. Lastly point D corresponds to the certain

income Drs 20,000. Since utity of certain income is greater 2 By (antainsticantes) tron utility of micertain income (expincine) $\left[R_{3}20,000 = 0.5.(10,000) + 0.5(30,000)\right] \text{ in figure1}$ consumer. in rista averse. rista lover Similarly when consumer in similarly when which will be convert her whility function will be convert like fig 2 Rish Lover. 20,000 3,0,000 Incom 10,000 clearly, Utility of certain income. fig 2. of ps 20,000 is less than utility of exp. mane As 20,000. So consumer prefers rista. Lastly when utility of certain income. is some as utility of 'expected income consumer is indifferent between two she is said to be rish NFility Disk neutral 20,000 30,000 Incare 10,000 clearly Utility function is linear

Riste Premium: Rista Premium is the maximum amount of money a sister-averse, person will pay to avoid I taking a risk. The magnitude of sista premium of is shonen by CF in fig1. We already have shown that with the risby alternative consumer's expected income will be Rs 20,000. . Point F to, shows utility caresponding to Des 20,000. - clearly U(F) = 14. None, consumer can attain the same amount of utility (=14) with certain m. come: Ry 16,000. This is showen by point q in fignel 1. Hence CF = 20,000 - 16,000 = As 4,000 in the rista premium in the present. rist averse consumer's point of view. Arrow Pratt Measure of Rista Aversion

Acrow and pratt. Aerene-Pratt measure is givenby the formula. I have like him win have $A = \frac{1}{u(x)} \frac{u(x)}{v(x)}$ x is the income of the consumer u(n) is the tidate utility correspondin where $A = - \frac{u'(\cdot)}{u'(\cdot)} > 0.$ $if u''(\cdot) u''(\cdot) u'' = 0.$ clearly => utility function is concave (fig1) $A = -\frac{u''(\cdot)}{u'(\cdot)} \left(\frac{20}{1000} \right)$ if (11250,) ~ 2 7 0 man) 20 =) vitility function in convert (fig 2) => "utility function in linear. (fig 3)

Indifference Curve Risk Aversion and To understand the relationship between rish. aversion and indifference cueve. We start veitre an example. Suppose one person, seeking job in the market, found following two. alternative jobs. Job 1: Incom 2000 (prob 0.5). Income Asiooo (prob 0.5) Job2 Tranersi510 (prob 0.99) Income RS 510 (perb 0.01) Expected incare for job1 0,5 (Ps 2000) + 0,5 (Ps 1000) Ps 1500---Expected Income for job 2 0.99'(Ps1510) + 0.01(Ps510) =Pr. 1200--D So both job will give same expected Re income / mean income for the jobseeber However, variability of \$ two jobs neithbe different. This variability fristaminen of these jobs are determined "by standard deviation (root mean-square deviation) Std. deviation of job 1 is given by:

p.5 (2000-1500)2 + 0.5 (1000-1500)2 = 0.5 (250,000) + 0.5 (250,000) = 1 PB a 250,000 = BS 500 Similarly standard deviation of job2 is given by $\sqrt{0.99(1510 - 1500)^2 + 0.01(510 - 1500)^2}$ 0.99 (100) + 0.01 (980,100) ..= Rs 99.50 --- (4) 9900 Pretrions (), 2, 3, 4) we can conclude D'both job will earn same expected (mean) return for job seeber. I std deviation of job! is higher while Std. deviation of job 2 is lower indicating that second job. in len risky than firstjøb so if jobseeker in a sistaaverse person he/she will choose job 2 and job 1 a hista Lover will be chosen by Applying the concept of mean. return and vousability/ poster hiskinen of return the relationship of Rista Aversion and Indifference Curve/ utility levels can be stated in the folloheing mannek.

 $U = E(R) - \frac{1}{2}A \times variance$ Where E(R) => expected/mean return A => level of eish averse nem variance => (S.D.)² shoreing variability or eisteinen of Lebour. is the utility level for obtained any return. To find out indifference over whility level should remain constant for any sister, return combination V4 V3 V2 exp? Return U4 7U37 U27U1 ν. 52 () () (a 53 " Rista/variabilitz figure Fig 4 shows that (SI, SZ) will give. same level of ubility Similarly for (S3, S4) or (S5, S6) A Comparing S3 with S5 => Rish (variability Same at 153 and 55. But extrem At 55 7 Deryretnen at 53. So consumed will obtain. Ligher utility at 55 campared to at Sz Camparing 54 with S6 ! Return San

in two points But vouiability is higher at sy than at so. So we can conclude that utility level. is positively related to return and negatively related to variability of the return. None we consider the relation-Ship between level of risk aversion and. utility with the help of following diagrams. Texp inco wep income UZ U2-VI VI Std deviation fig 6 fig 5 fig & shows indifference oner of any consumer who is slightly rish averse. while in fig 5 consumer is highly risk Indifference croves are upward sloping because as variability laista is negative - by related to utility, highereista I should be accompanied by higher exp. retwon/ income to keep utility level fined / constant.

=) From fig 5, it is clear that as consumer, is slightly eist averse (eists aversion, level is lone), togge large invease in standard deviation of income requires only a small in vease in exp. income to leave consumer remain on some indiff. =) In constraist to that fig 5 shows consumer with high level of risk awersion. So an increase in standard deviation of income require to condig a large. increase in exp incare to be leave the consumer remain on same indifference cure. The proces of reducing rish There are several ways, by which consumery and investors can I reduce sista of choice of their investments. We are describing some commen méasures to reduce rish . () Insmance 2 Diversification of postfolios : Hun 3 obtaining more information about choices and payoff.

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Proved / Constitution

11 First of all any risk averse person. will always tay to avoid risk by pullasing insurance. They will be willing to pay more on the instrance that will covered help them to. recover fully / maximum anount of financial loss consumer might For the inswance companies Suffer 1991 "law of large number" is followed as peinciple. This means inswance companies will try to sell oft their product to their peoduct to ba large number of consumers. to avoid, paying full amount (equivalent to. the premium) to the beneficiary. In this way, larger the number of . purchasing inswance policies, lesser will be rista involved for the insurance companies. Secondly, another method of reduction of rish is diversification of postfolios. This. means. investor will alway try to invest their money in as many activities as possible. instead of beeping the entire money in a single activity. Hence more the diversifi-cation, lener is the rista.

I EL II 12 Thirdly, consumer / investor will try to acquire more information about the & market outcome, as Because higher the information. availability lener will be the gap between I expected income and actual. income from any specific invest-ment/choice of market outcome. Sometimes to reduce risk, investor consumer might be ready to pay for acquiring information from on some reliable/ reputed. Some cels, he to be company into the sources, he are the sources, he are the sources of the sour and the suise hard find the E Swarm a Company as condition of section of section of such if diversification of portifictures This Secondly incom snoksting would alway the for present present money in all the A driver that the second is welter in the

CC 202: Managerial Economics (ME)

Module –II

Unit 5 : Risk and Uncertainties in Managerial Decision Making

(Pallavi Julasaria)

-> IM 16.1.2012 25 marks Topic: choice and Decision under Uncertainty Uncertainty: there is an par outcome. I there is a probability attached with the outcome. Certain event: when it really happene. Optimisation plan of a Decision maker under uncertainty. > Topic of discussion How is & affected under uncertainty. consider > 2 events > nop En occuring with probability them, y: 1-P. E: Sum is I] Hure, N, y -> outcomes [cortain] P, I-P >> probabilities. $L = \{ \chi_i : P_j : \chi_i = P_j \} = Lottory.$ $H = \{ \chi_i : P_j : \chi_i = P_j \} = Lottory.$ $H = \{ \chi_i : P_j : \chi_i : P_i \} = \{ \chi_i$ $L = \{ \varkappa_1 : P_1; \varkappa_2 : P_2 \} \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \ldots$ We define this as simple cottery, Properties of a Simple & Lottery: Let us take ex as'- L = & n: 1. 1. J: Office noccure with But eince probabilities exists -> not exactly roccure with a containtly but almost equal to containty. a coetaintly but almost equal to PROPERTY 1. Indifference: L={n:1; y: 0} ~ n (not absolutely catain, 19.94; chance, but there is prob 2 n. y doel'nt existe) yk It gutt approaching For all practical purposes, take as ~ n. 2. Reflexivity: Li={n:p; y:1-p; y:1-p? Definition of Compound Lottory:- consider a Lottory, L={n:p; y:1-p? anothere, L'= {n:q; y=1-q? - oneq out come is high camponer

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One outcome is contain, other is lottory. $L = \{x: p: y: I - p^2\}$ $L' = \xi \pi : q'; L: 1 - q''$ $\gamma: q + p(1 - N) \begin{bmatrix} :n occurs if L occurs, l \\ occurs with prob 1 - q \end{bmatrix}$ q: (1 - p)(1 - N) $L' = \{\pi: \eta + p(1-\eta)\}; \{(1-p)(1-\eta)\}$ if both events is a lottery $L_{1} = \{ \pi : P; \forall : 1 - P^{2} \}$ $L_{2} = \{ \pi : Q; j = 1 - Q^{2} \}$ $L = \{L_1: r_j: L_2: I_T r_j\}$ $\gamma_{1}: rp + (1-r) qV (1-q) q$ q: r(1-p) + (1-r) (1-q) q $L = \{ \chi : \chi p + (1 - \chi) q \} (1 - \chi) + (1 - \chi) \}$ > A simple lottery ~ PROPERTY 3 - AU compound lotteries can be - proken down as simple lotterike, An advantage > we can show seesult in tams Lat we take ix as -E. J. Lince. probabilities cared -Another Concept - RIS Kromis lad putpinions Difference \$/w Risk & Uncertainty Risk: L = S. Non P 5. Humpsdoph 2 eituation where, n, y known 2 paleo known Pure Uncertainty: - My Knowny NIP, unknown, I we know rel'é b/w ther por obabilities, know slome of properties of prop have got other into of perobability. Uncertainty other into regarding pis there

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Both of them obey (first 2 len) flienenis 2 suesults). (insome books, (insome books, same UTILITY: Choice, under uncertainty. UTILITY: Choice, under uncertainty. Imeasured of whom, y: 1-p2 L = their P > yalk about Expected Utility In case of whay, we talk about Expected Utility In case of whay, we talk about France. EUCL) = PU(rc) + (I-P)U(r) [Additive way] This f= is famous as - Von Neuman-Morganstan Utility f=, personal in Rich context. worked in Risk. context. In the case of n out comes, Jensen's hung. $EU(L) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} P_i U(\pi_i) \int U(\Xi_i, P_i \star_i) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} P_i U(\chi_i).$ n: ni (p), n, p: pi - pn. e Obstander Llo f. Dutcome $n \rightarrow arsociated$ with probability 'p' incl doesn't How ind maximiser, maximises utilly f=". Incl doesn't know whether n will occur, or not Choice under Uncertainty?-Outcome y - ariocrated with prob 1-P . Inderidual faces a lottery Personil optimisel the expected Utildy Expected Utility: associated with lottery. $f_{1} = V_{1} = V_{1} + U(x) + U(-p) U(y)$ Von Neumann - Morgenettin Vtility function. Diff DIW :-Rick the Uncertainty. minerate for the starter pre known p. unknown of the but the

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undisted bed the Rive on Calculations semaine Uncertent Uncertain Situation Considering I - Pm:p & y: avoid sursk Rick Aversim outcome pref to risk Catain Original U pref to Expec Ulibity EU = PU(x) + (I - P)U(y)This is < How to write Risk Averaion in Expression What is comparable & have to Certainty Equivalent to Loltery: Combination Convex If all expected U -> convex u(Y) Exp U ling b/w u(x) e u(y). P71+ (1-P)Y conver combi b/w x 2 y REAK A vers & pend 81 pu(x)+(1-p) u(y) Km+(1-k) USpn+ (1-P) 4 2 ≥ infa all, OSKEI lobtery Certainty it to utilly equivant of exceede U of Expected Olilit hold Neuhal prifer uncertain situation to astainty Kisk lover ! USprt (I-P)YZ SPU(X)+(I-P)U(Y) considering always - n Voorable system 1 they worked out in 2 variable.

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We will always have to deal with a variable. Properties to Extracted = = E(0) follow same sule as u(x) 2 u(y). [H.w] concared ?. Risk Aversion : condition. $v_{\xi} p_{x} + c_{i} - p_{y}^{2} \ge p_{v}(v_{i}) + c_{i} - p_{v}(y)$ equality is perder time b/w Rice lover & aversion. Objective Probability All uncertain perception diff per proces to person. judgements, perception diff not be eased RIVE AND Subjective Probability ney is same. p's may not be came for all the individuals using pobability probable that all the <u>2 contexts of using pobability</u> probable that <u>2 contexts of using pobability</u> for the <u>2 contexts</u> of covt <u>1 biblicture probability is experimented</u> the <u>2 contexts</u> of covt While and of this century. The degree of belief in the probability here we are preserve making the statement Objecture Probability: The outcomes of an experiment Their can conceivable, be supeated an infinite no. of their can conceivable, be supeated an infinite no. of their and usentrally similar conditions. The outcomet will be called events, by the particulation of the superwill be called events (Es - Deraising a seid fall from a win of 20 balls. The peobability here sufers to the proposition of carry in which the event occurs in such repetitions of the experiment. en a martin a ma

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particular wealth Wo. Risk_ Aversion we are havi I have 2 options. Lave contain income to add to they (2) wealth $V(N_0+Z)$ Expected utility. (WO+N) P Wot L $(w_0 + y) : 1 - p$ itility from certain Income > Expected Utility of lottory $V(W_0+Z) \ge EU\{W_0+L^2\}$ Risk Aversion - U(Wo+Z)>pU (Wo+x)+ $(1-b) \cup (Woty)$ Equality is indifference. When equicitity holds, indifference b/w buying lottery or not. Equality means Acceptance level of Rick $U(W_0 + Z_1) = pU(W_0 + x_1) + (1 - p)U(W_0 + y_1)$ Hore ney are variables. Y supportion par Trying tolook at shape of fC's so we differendiate the egy" to box at slope. 21134 /0 1004 Inpliers => Notz constant.d = pU'(Wo+ r) + (1-p) U'(Wot y) dy id ditrip Unewster (State White when Ean cone i. dry = price pour of petrone billos and win Puren probabilitier (given probabilitier 1) (given probabilitier 1) (s const) Stop dry (0,0)

9.10.2012 Link Avoisim. tet. Je. nsen's Inequality If there are 2 outcomes X, X2 with probabilities P, 1-p. then person is such averse $\bigcup_{i} P_{X_{i}} + (i - P)_{X_{2}} \neq PU(X_{i}) + (i - P)_{V(X_{2})}$ certain utility Expected Utility. person getting under artain condition is exceeding expected " utility Lottery of n outcomes -XniPn SX1; P1 ; X2:12 ; $\sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i = J$ $\bigcup \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i \times i \right\} \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i \cup (X_i)$ Jehnson's Inequality your Creometry 17 U(X) care lying above cho U(X2 join U(X) 2 U(X) UCX) >x Littis -> points lying 0 × × ×2 curve lying above chad, px,+(1-P)x2 concaref: , then the person :0 is stick avage If whilety of 1/2 1's U'' < 0

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Pool. Pallari Julasaria, U-5 Risk & Unwrtainly CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINITY Q) What is meant by seik a vocsion? why are some prople likely to be visk avorse while others are sist lovers? show that concave utility of money function of an individual implies that shel is seisk averse. In Risk aversion means preferereing, a cuitain income to a risky income with the same expected value. Risk avoesion is the most common. attituder toward sites. A fair gample i's a gample whose expected relacion is O. Individuals one said to be nikk a voes if they are not willing to undertake a fair Risk neutral persons are indifferent ketwen accepting or sujecting a faire gamble. kisk loving indéviduals ave lager to undbetake à faire gample. Utility function of income will be difficient for these 's groups of indeviduals. Expected utility theory helps us to differendiate I between them, We can explain this with the help of an example. Suppose a poeson have

ei the a certain income of Rs 20,000 e un probabilition an income of \$\$ 30,000 " the probability 0.5(1/2) and an income RS10,000 with probability 0.5 (1/2). Thus expected incomers 1 10,000)+ -1(30,000) = No 20,00 () for a risk averse person, manginal utility for diminishing, thus have a concave utile ty function. with income 10,000, utelity is given by E RS 30.000 ... & utility is 18 w, the RS 30,000. The expected utility of acountain income is 14 - an aberage of utility at point A (10) & delig at E (U18) is shown by point F, het this while ty ke U*. Utility generated if \$20,000 were easined without-selsk (with cost ainsty) is 16 given at point P The expected willity associated with risky gob (U*)= 14 is up than 16 if \$20,000 is earned with y ility 4(4) 30,000 20,000 10,000 O

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Thus, sieth avoise pisson will not take Flit gemple, For utskaverse presson, losses are more i'mpatant (in terms of change i'm atelity than gains. A 10,000 rde in in cont RS 20,000 to KS 20,000 generates inderage I'm utility of 2 units, a 1/2 10,000 decres i'n income from 120,000 to 10,000 creates a hors of eitility of 6 units U(Y) 10,000 20,000 30,00 00 U* = U (20,000) U* > U(20,000) Bo wality with visk fisk Lover I Willity with within preferes an unwitain i's same incom Risk Nuutral Income to workein income. So indiffuent b/w artain l'anastain income MU of income is constant ENote - Expected utility theory says to maximuse expected utility.

(a) How can risk be seduced through diverification 1000 Diversification means succucing ner through by ac allocate ngt seesources to a variety of activities whose outcomes are not 'closele oculatel. If we consider example of a job selling appuances - aire conditionetes and seatures, of course, seller can not ke swee now not a cold the weather \$3. will be next year. of There is 0-5 point ability that it will be bulatively hot year and 0.5 -propability that it will be idd. If the siller sills only Acz o only malors, his actual income will be eithor \$\$12,000 of 30,000. Marvelad . is Income from sales of Appliances Hot wather (cold We ather 30,000 AC 12,000 30,000 AT CAL Heater 1 12,000 (H's expected income will be > 0.5(30,000) + 0.5(12,000) = 21,000 But, if seller diversity by dividing gaine evenly petween the two product. In that case, his income will be restainly #12,000 Rs 21,000 regardless of weather If weather is not, he will earn 15,000 from AU conditions sales and NS6000 from

heater sales; if it is cold, he will earn 16000 from Acs and Ro 15,000 from reatures. Thus diversification eliminates visit of learning very low income of 1012,000, in case weather is not favourable to the product the selles sells Thus fisk can be minimised by diversification - by allocating time so that he sell two no more products (whose sales are not closely related)solo seather than a single product. Risk can be eliminated by diversification if sales are of negatively correlated Numinical Sums example:a) A resk avere proceson is offered a choice between a g'ample paying him. RS 1000 with probability 0.25 and Re100 with probability 0.75 au cutain inc payment - of R325. Which would be choos? 050 Explain priedly. the expected section from the gamble 15 = 0.25(1000) + 0.75(100)= 250 + 75 32 5 Another choice available to the suisk avoise poison is of a contain income of ls 325 This the expected referring from the gample and the certain income is

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same. but a suisk avoise person chooses a certain meome to a suisky income with same ppe de Value. @ Though probability of getting a very might income Ro1000 is 0.25 Dut much higher = 0.75 Thus the seish could be measured by standarg deviation is = $\frac{\sum b (x_i - \overline{x})^2}{\sum b}$ = $\frac{b}{M} = \frac{b}{M} = \frac{b}{m} \frac{b}{m}$ mi = income $0.25(1000-325)^2 + 0.75(100-325)^2$ 0-25 (a25 B Thus there is a nisk of 225 units. But there is no such seisk associated with cortain payment of RS 325. Therefore the nick avoise posson will constidur the loss more than the & pocobable gain and would choose the ceretain income of \$\$325. [SD - I quare not of the weighted average of the squares of the deviations of the of the squares of the deviations payoffer associated with each outcome from their expected section]

Oh () Expected income from the lottery will be 0.1(00) + 0.2(50) + 0.7(10) = 10 + 10 + 7 = 27 of what would a sielle neutral person would pay the lotlery? An Ante expected value - probability wighted average of the pay offer an ocial. with all possible 'outcomes. $E(\dot{x}) = Pr_1 X_1 + Pr_2 X_2 + - - + Pr_n X_n$ H suite neutral pore is indifferent between a contain and an unlostering amount with same expected income. To parginal utility from income is constant for a risk neutral person thus a st line for the origin ! Thus expected utility from the income from lottery is equal to the utility fon contain income, As utilitées do not differ, seisk neutral would not be seeady to pay the lottery te would not be ready to pay for a suisky income knowing that the suiskfree income yilds same util #. fisk loves could pay toplay the lottery lost visk nutral could not.

Plug a choice budget line of an investor juding a choice between a viewy asset and uisk- free asset using standard deviation Julie conditioning of suiskiness. Thous for the equilibrium of a siste loving and a sisk - avoise investor using indiffience curves under apove situation Cabo something that provides a flow of money or sources to its owner is called esset. An ablet may be sucky and sickless or rivk free) asset A risky abset that provides on uncortain flow l'of money ou sorvices to its owner. Ex - corporate bonds where issuing corporation could go bankrupt and fail to pay bond owners their interest and principal, Long term Indian brovernment- bonds that mature in 10-15 yes could be nisky because of inflation, the pos eventual payment could be wathen in see al terms kirk-free assits are those assits that provides a flow of money a sourices that is known with conternity. Er-Shertteim Indian Government-pondecalled Treasury bills are withless of they materia few months and Endian croverment will probably not default the bond. Expected Return is the return that

an asset dearn on average Although scirky ageds like stocks is have nights expected section than suckless april, they cavery much more niev. pisk is measured by the standard deviation of real annual Kiturn. hiven that, the invertor faces a choice petween a subby and sich fue asket, he will allocate his budget between these two assits and try to maximise utility Let the seisk free secturen on serskeen assi- ke R. J., EActual Retwine expected and expected section from investing in suidky asket he ham [actual return is sim] The risky agent will have a highler expected section than sigk-free assit (lm>l; Investment patfolio - hets, set & requer to paction of investor's savings placed in visky asset and (1-b) used to purchase seisters assit. . Expected fituen on total partfolio Kp i's a wighted average of expected Rp = bRm + (1-b)Rf we (1) Risking of the partfolio could be measured by Istandaved deviation of portfolio, 6p (with one susky and one sisk-free aiset) is the fraction of the portfolio

rested in the sersky assel- times the Frandavid deviation of that asset -BP=bbm _ (2) To determine the investor's decision to accor invert- in seaky a risk faction b, we must show that she faces à rive-return tradeoff analogous to consumer's budget line, egt = c') can be initlen cy $R_{r}p = R_{f} + b(R_{m} - R_{f}) - rs)$ $from (2), b = \frac{6p}{6m}$ Pulty in (3) | Rp = Rf + Ep (Rm-Rf) 6p 6m hecaute This equation is a budget line because it describes the reade-off between risk (6p) and expected section (R.P) Because Rm, R/ 26m we constants, the slope Rm-Rt is constant, as is the intercept Rf The equation says that the expected return of the postfolio, inverases as the standard deviation (method pinouases The stope of the pudget line Km-Rf is called the price of sisk because it tells us how much fixed an investor must incure to enjoy a higher expected return.

prog me Expertision Rp V VRitta Rm Upin Expected RB RA R ٥ 6B Subp 61 Rf lg-559 Pindy ck Gm 200 6m ndwid Deviation Return If our investor wants no suisk she itvest all her funds in sisk-free asset (6=0)and earn an expected setwen Rf. 10 se receive a higher expected return she meest incove some risk. For example, ene could invertall her funcly in stocky (b=1) earning an expected section Rm but incurvering a standard deviation om. Or she night invest come fraction of her funde in each type of assit, earning an expected section somewhere between Ry and Rm and facing a standard diviation less than 6m but quate than O. Equilibrium of Risk avoise & Risk lover -Indifférence curve describes combinations of sure and return that haves the inverted these for a guirk-avvice poison, Ics will be up ward cloping because suisk is underiveable thus with a greates amount of susk, it takes

a greater amount of return to make the individual equally well off such lover JU total But la d will be flatter because comparatively take higher suches he do is willing 10 slightly highes between, expected fora where budget line Eq= 1's attained 1's targent to I C. The invistor will tay to reach nights use for a given suite is higher on a higher IC. IC recause for a Jertwon VA VÁ For a suit avoir puson portfolio consist of mainly Jusk pel asset. Thus expected reterro RA Ro' slightly Rf greater than oursk-fee scotes n. 6/ 1's small, 6Ã Sm Ô nvests Rim large raction R 2 rusky asset gn bedted won will Rt De Laveges, i't allabo be nikers. Sm fisklaver

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Q) Distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. [4] this & when there is asymmetrie a information - the struction in which a puyoe and a seller possess different information about a transaction a adverse selection occurs. Advacse selection is a form of market failure sees utting when products of different qualities are sold at a r single price because of asymmetric infolmations, so that too much of the low-quality product and to 0 with of title of one night quality are sold. Moral Hazard - when a pointy whose actéons we un observed can laffect the probability or magnitude of a payment associated with an event, We can explain the concept- of Advere selection with an example of analysis made by Budge Awerlof on maderiet for lemon - mkt for used car. The following decagram shows that when there is imperfect- information have sellers of products have better information about product quality than buyers -thus 'lemons problem' weises "which tobs quality pods are driven out by high quality of odds.

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* alter cultimities only relivant ad 100,000 11 1.0 \$ 000 Rag 50,000 DM . Dιη REBLH -DL *P*_L 25,000 - 50,000 (a) High Quality 50,000->75,000 (b) Low-Quality cover. cars Pit 2 Pi are de curves for high quality since e. I nitially purper views 50, 600 of 2.0 while each kind of case is sold, making à purchase puyer views all cases as of medium quality. so their perceived demand shifts to PM, Likewise in (b) perceived dd curve ta cow quality cases shifts from \$ 10 the As a result sale of night quality coor falls & that of con quality reises. At consumere realize that most cars cold are of low quality, again the parceived demand shifts to DIM of co was align avoid sall's sold. This shifting continues centre only low - quality curs tow quality goods can drive high quality goods

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(of purkm 3 MC 2.50 2 MC 1.50--D=HB > Kmc 100 140 pier week Moral howard alters the ability of markets to allocate resources afficiently. D gives the demand for automobile divine Edownward slopping : people sporter to alternative transport as corr Edownward slopping : people sporter to alternative divines of With no moral harzond the driver driver 100 miles, which is efficient amount, with moral hazard, one drives perceives the cost-pres mile to MEZ & dvives 140 miles. Motal hazard, not only altors kha vious but also creates economic mefficiency pcz insured individual percuives eithes For cost as benefit- of a ctivity different for true social cost à benefit? From Madalla Fa Adverse selection - In case of Lemons mkt for used card, sellers of lemons will git more than what their lars are woth and sellers of good - quality

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cans will get lost than what their cons re worker of ause of improved information Thus average wintig you down and , o does the average price buyers and willing to pay tagain, rave with the - than averaged quality go off market and the procen continues will ilemond' drive out- all good cars from The problem here is that buyley and cillors are unable to communicate accurate information, However, in practice, numerous institutions are that counteract the advorse affects of quality uncortainty suggested by temons model. for ex- there are automotive survice untrus that can check the quality of used care and quality at a cost. Thus information beaus a cost. also Moral hazard -Advise selection - Even a cellor would ide sexpressions a brand new car, cowich he know is in parfect condition expects to selle it in much less than he pourd fait. 10

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Paper CC 202:

Managerial Economics (ME)

Module-II

Unit 6: Managerial Theories of Firm

[Prepared by Dr. Susmita Chatterjee & Dr. Nilanja Biswas]

WILLIAMSON'S THEORY OF MANAGERIAL UTILITY MAXIMISATION

Managerial utility maximisation theory, developed by American economist Oliver E Williamson, describes managers' utility versus profit maximisation in corporate environment, where management is separated from owners (shareholders). According to the theory managers take decisions that prioritise their own utility maximisation over principals' profits, provided the firm can generate minimum profit demanded by the principals to maintain managers' job security. In this theory the principal agent problem emerges.

The managerial utility function includes variables such as salary, job security, power, status, dominance, prestige and professional excellence of managers. Of these, salary is the only quantitative variable and thus measurable. The other variables are non-pecuniary, which are non-quantifiable. The variables expenditure on staff salary, management slack, discretionary investments can be assigned nominal values. Thus these will be used as proxy variables to measure the real or unquantifiable concepts like job security, power, status, dominance, prestige and professional excellence of managers, appearing in the managerial utility function.

Utility function or **"expense preference**"¹ of a manager can be given by:

 $U=U(S,M,I_d)$

where U denotes the Utility function, S denotes the "monetary expenditure on the staff", M stands for "Management Slack" and I_D stands for amount of "Discretionary Investment".

"Monetary expenditure on staff" include not only the manager's salary and other forms of monetary compensation received by him from the business firm but also the number of staff under the control of the manager as there is a close positive relationship between the number of staff and the manager's salary.

"Management slack" consists of those non-essential management perquisites such as entertainment expenses, lavishly furnished offices, luxurious cars, large expense accounts, etc. which are above minimum to retain the managers in the firm. These perks, even if not provided would not make the manager quit his job, but these are incentives which enhance their prestige and status in the organisation in turn contributing to efficiency of the firm's operations. The Management Slack is also a part of the cost of production of the <u>fir</u>m.

"**Discretionary investment**" refers to the amount of resources left at a manager's disposal, to be able to spend at his own discretion. For example, spending on latest equipment, furniture, decoration material, etc. It satisfies their ego and gives them a sense of pride. These give a boost to the manager's esteem and status in the organisation. Such investments are over and above the amount required for the survival of the firm (such as periodic replacement of the capital equipment).

Concepts of profit in the model

Williamson has put forth four main concepts of profits in his model:

Actual profit (Π)

П=R-C-S

where *R* is the total revenue, *C* is the cost of production and *S* is the staff expenditure.

Reported profit (Π_r)

П_r=П-М

where Π is the actual profit and *M* is the management slack.

Minimum profit (Π₀)

It is the amount of profit after tax deducted which should be paid to the shareholders of the firm, in the form of dividends, to keep them satisfied. If the minimum level of profit cannot be given out to the shareholders, they might resort of bulk sale of their shares which will transfer the ownership to other hands leaving the company in the risk of a complete take over. Since the shareholders have the voting rights, they might also vote for the change of the top level of management. Thus the job security of the manager is also threatened.Ideally the reported profits must be either equal to or greater than the minimum profits plus the taxes, as it is only after paying out the minimum profit that the additional profit can be used to increase the managerial utility further.

 $\Pi_r \ge \Pi_0 + T$

where Π_r is the reported profit, Π_0 is the minimum profit and *T* is the tax.

Discretionary profit (Π_D)

It is basically the entire amount of profit left after minimum profits and tax which is used to increase the manager's utility, that is, to pay out managerial emoluments as well as allow them to make discretionary investments.

$$\Pi_D = \Pi - \Pi_0 - \Pi$$

where Π_D is the discretionary profit, Π is the actual profit, Π_0 is the minimum profit and T is the tax amount.

However, what appears in the managerial utility function is discretionary investments (I_D) and not discretionary profits. Thus it is very important to distinguish between the two as further in the model we would have to maximize the managerial utility function given the profit constraint.

$I_D = \Pi_r - \Pi_0 - T$

where Π_r is the reported profit, Π_0 is the minimum profit and T is the tax amount.

Thus it can be seen that the difference in the Discretionary Profit and the Discretionary investment arises because of the amount of managerial slack. This can be represented by the given equation

$$\Pi_D = I_D + \mathbf{M}$$

where Π_D is the discretionary profit, I_D is the Discretionary investment and M is the management slack.

Model framework

For simple representation of the model the managerial slack is considered to be zero. Thus there is no difference between the actual profit and reported profit, which implies that the discretionary profit is equal to the discretionary investment. I.e.

$$\Pi_r = \Pi \text{ or } \Pi_D = I_D$$

where Π_r is the reported profit, Π is the actual profit, Π_D is the discretionary profit and I_D is the discretionary investment.

Such that the utility function of the manager becomes

 $U=U(S, I_D)$

where \mathbf{S} is the staff expenditure and $\mathbf{I}_{\mathbf{D}}$ is the discretionary investment.

There is a trade off between these two variables. Increase in either will give the manager a higher level of satisfaction. At any point of time the amount of both these variables combined is the same, therefore an increase in one would automatically require a decrease in the other. The manager therefore has to make a choice of the correct combination of these two variables to attain a certain level of desired utility.

Substituting $I_D = \Pi - \Pi_0 - T$

in the new managerial utility function, it can be rewritten as

U=U (s, П- П₀ -T)

The relationship between the two variables in the manager's utility function is determined by the profit function. Profit of a firm is dependent on the demand and cost conditions. Given the cost conditions the demand is dependent of the price, staff expenditures and the market condition.

$$X=f(S,\overline{P},\overline{E})$$

Price and market condition is assumed to be given exogenously at equilibrium. Thus the profit of the firm becomes dependent on the staff expenditure which can be written as

Π=f (X)= f(S, P, E)

Discretionary profit can be rewritten as

$\Pi_{D} = f(S, \overline{P}, \overline{E}) - \Pi_{0} - T)$

In the model, the managers would try to maximise their utility given the profit constraint

Subject to $\Pi \ge \Pi_0 + T$

In the graph below U1 corresponds to the highest level of Utility on which either combination of Staff Expenditure and Discretionary Profit give manager the same satisfaction.

Graphical Representation



A manager would aim to achieve combination of Staff Expenditure and Discretionary Profit at the level of utility U1, however in the point of equilibrium with firms profit (above minimum profit) the level of Staff Expenditure is such that Discretionary Profit is not at the maximum and therefore shareholders are not earning all the profit they could if manager's utility level was lowered through decreased Staff Expenditure and/or Management Slack. Has the manager allocated resources so that his utility would be at lower levels U2 or U3 then Discretionary Profit and therefore overall Profit of the firm would be higher. In other words, once minimum profit has been achieved managers would tend to allocate firm's resources towards increasing their own utility rather than maximising shareholder's profit.

Marris Model of Managerial Enterprise

R Marris had developed 'A Model of Managerial Enterprise' where the goal of the firm is maximixation of balanced rate of growth (g^*), growth of demand for the products of the firm (g_D) and growth of supply of capital (g_c). According to Marris by jointly maximizing the rate of growth of demand of the products and capital the managers achieve maximization of their own utility as well as the utility of the owners-shareholders.

The utility of the managers is $U_{M} = f$ (salaries, power status, job security)

The utility of the owners is $U_0 = f$ (profits, capital, output, market share, public esteem)

Since Marris restricts his model to steady rate of growth over time it can be argued that most of the relevant economic magnitudes change simultaneously with the long run growth rate. Hence the Utility function of the managers and owners can be written as

 $U_M = f(g_{D_c}s)$, $U_O = f(g_C)$ where 's' is a measure of the job security.

Now s can be measured be a weighted average of three crucial ratios namely liquidity ratio, leverage-debt ratio and the profit retention ratio. The three ratios reflect the financial policy of the firm and are given as

Liquidity Ratio = Liquid Assets / Total Assets = L/A = a₁

Leverage or debt ratio = Value of Debts/ Total Assets = D/A = a₂

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Retention Ratio = Retained Profits/ Total Profit = a<sub>3</sub>
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The three financial ratios are combined into a single financial parameter (a) which is known as the 'financial security constraint'. This is weighted average of the three above ratios.

Given the objective the constraints faced by the managers are

- a) Managerial Constraint Marris followed Penrose's concept of a constraint set by the capacity of the top management. The managerial capacity can be increased by hiring new mamagers.
- b) Job Security Constraint- this is a constraint set by the managers to the disutility associated with the dismissal from job. The constraint is influenced by the financial policy of the firm which again is controlled by the optimal levels of financial ratios.

Model: The objective of the firm is to maximise the balanced growth rate (g*) where the instrumental variables are a (financial constraints), d (rate of diversification) and m (profit margin).

According to the Average pricing rule

P=C+A+(R&D) + m

Where P= price given from the market

C= Production Cost(given)

A= Advertising cost and other selling expense

R & D = Research and Development expense

m= average profit margin.

m= P-C-A-(R&D) and $\frac{\partial m}{\partial A} < 0, \frac{\partial m}{\partial (R \& D)} < 0$

further m is used as a proxy for the policy variables A and R&D. Given this pricing rule the firm maximizes the balanced rate of growth.

Now, $g_D = f(d,k)$ where d=diversification rate defined as the number of new products introduced per time period, k= proportion of successful new products.

But according to Marris Diversification can be of two forms: a) Differentiated Diversification- Firm introduces a completely new product which has no close substitutes. b) Imitative Diversification-Firm introduces a new product which is a substitute for similar commodities already produced by existing competitors.

It is assumed that g_D is positively related to d but g_D increases at a diminishing rate with d, $\frac{\partial gD}{\partial d} > 0$.

Again k= f(d, P, A, R & D, intrinsic value)

Since m is used as a proxy for the policy variables A and R&D and m is negatively related to A and R&D so it can be inferred that k is negatively related to m.

Thus summarising it can be written $g_D = f(d,m)$ where $\frac{\partial gD}{\partial d} > 0$, $\frac{\partial gD}{\partial m} < 0$

Graphically this can be shown as



The above diagram imply that at a given price of the product lower m implies

- a) Larger A and or R&D expenses
- b) Larger k
- c) Higher g_D

According to the assumptions of the Marris model the rate of growth of capital supply g_c is given as $g_c=a.f(\pi)$

a= financial security constraint, π = level of total profits.

Now, $\pi = (m, k/X)$ where m= average rate of π , k/X= capital output ratio.

Now, $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial m} > 0$, and k/X=f(d) where given k the relation between d and X is as follows:

- a) Upto a certain level of d, 'X' and 'd' are +ly related.
- b) Beyond that X reaches a maximum
- c) Then X falls with further increase in d.

Substituting k/X in the profit function π =(m, d)

Using this it can be written g_c = a.f(m, d) where according to Marris a the financial parameter is exogenously determined by the risk attitudes of the managers. Then keeping 'a' fixed there is a +ve relation between g_c and 'm'. Lastly keeping 'a' and 'm' constant as 'd' increases (upto the point of optimal use of R&D and team of managers) then after that g_c is –vely related with 'd'. Thus the following curve is drawn



Summarizing the above arguments the Marris Model in its complete form can be given as:

- 1. $g_D = f(m,d)$ Demand Growth equation
- 2. π =(m, d) Profit equation
- 3. $g_c = a.f(m, d)$ supply of capital equation
- 4. $a \le a^*$ security constraint
- 5. $g_D = g_C$ balanced growth equilibrium condition

In the above equation structure 'a' is exogenously determined, π is endogenously determined, 'm' and 'd' are policy instruments. From the balanced growth equilibrium condition there is one equation with two unknowns 'd' and 'm'. The model can only be solved if one of the variables 'm' or 'd' is subjectively determined by the managers.

Graphically the equilibrium of the firm can be represented by the intersection of the g_D and g_C curves associated with a given profit rate.



The equilibrium

Marris defines the curve joining the intersection points as the balanced growth curve given the financial constraint 'a'. The firm is in equilibrium when it reaches the highest point on the balanced growth curve.

Cyert and March Model

The long-established Microeconomic theory of firm behaviour considers profit maximization to be the sole goal of a firm. It is considered that though a firm can face alternate markets viz., perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly or monopoly, but in every case the owners will seek to maximize the profits only. In contrast the managerial theories of the firm (or organization) consider the firm to be a coalition. Firm is not owned by a single owner, rather by multiple stockholders. The interests of these stockholders, managers, workers, consumers and suppliers may differ. The focus of behavioural model of Cyert and March is to explain the methods of conflict resolution.

The firm which is being considered in this model is mainly a large multiproduct firm owned by a number of stockholders. Owners of firm and managers of firm are two different groups. Firm is generally considered to operate in imperfectly competitive market. As information is not complete, uncertainty prevails. This type of assumption about a firm is more realistic. Each group within a firm, be it owners, managers, workers, consumers and suppliers, will have different utility functions. Owners will seek to maximize profits, managers will seek better salaries and power, workers will seek higher wages and better conditions to work, consumers will seek low price but more variety and quality and so on. But out of all these groups, the most important group is considered to be 'managers', followed by shareholders and workers.

The most important feature of the behavioural theory is that it does not focus directly on the goals of a multiproduct large firm rather tries to explain the process i.e., 'How these goals originate?' According to Cyert and March, the goals of firms originate mainly because of demands of alternate groups. These demands further depend on availability of information, expectations, aspirations and achievements of other groups in same or other firms. The basic dichotomy in the structure of firm is accepted in the behavioural model. In this dichotomy, on one hand there is the organization (as a whole) called as 'firm' and on other hand, there are the individual groups and sub-groups within the firm. The individual groups and sub-groups within the firm will have different objectives than 'firm' as a whole. Further, it is considered that demands and past achievements are highly correlated. Demands of each group do not remain static and as keep on changing according to past achievements (of group and that of other groups, in getting their demands met) and other changes in the firm and its environment. Here changes in firm are very significant because if firm performance remains static or stagnant, demands may also remain static.

ROLE OF TIME-LAG : By time lag we mean the lag between past achievements and future aspirations. According to Cyert and March, this time lag can be used by the firm to generate and accumulate surplus which eventually can be used for conflict resolution (conflict between different groups as the demands of various groups and sub-groups may be in continuous conflict with each other and the groups may be continuously bargaining with each other).

ROLE OF TOP MANAGEMENT: The role of top management is extremely significant in Cyert and March model. Not only the top management sets the goals of the firm, as the goals may be in conflict with various groups within the firm, top management works towards reconciliation of goals too.

According to Cyert and March, a firm has mainly five goals:

- How much to produce (Production goal)
- Inventory goal
- Sales goal
- Market share goal
- Profit goal

1) Production Goal : Mainly it is the production department which takes care of production goal. Smooth production process also implies that production is evenly distributed over time and seasonal as well as cyclical variations in demand are taken care of. If demand is too high, it may require overworking by workers and other factors of production. Similarly, if demand dips, it may lead to over-production and lay-off of workers.

2) Inventory Goal This goal either may come from production department or from sales department. In some instances the firm may have a separate inventory department too. Production department will always seek sufficient stock of raw materials while the sales department will seek sufficient stock of finished product.

3) Sales Goal The strategy for sales will be a part of sales goal.

4) Market Share Goal It may further involve market research, analyzing the competitors and deciding the advertisement strategy.

5) Profit Goal Top management sets the profit goal to satisfy the shareholders. Furthermore, as the firm may have relied on banks and other financial institutions for its financing, profit goal also acts as a benchmark to satisfy them.

According to Cyert and March, law of diminishing returns operates even in case on top managers' abilities to take decisions. Therefore as the goals increase, the efficiency of decision making may decrease. Therefore, the firms mainly focus on satisfying behaviour. The concept of 'Satisfying behaviour' was originally given by Simon (1955). He writes, " Among the common constraints- which are not themselves the objects of rational calculation-are (1) the set of alternatives open to choice, (2) the relationships that determine the pay-offs("satisfactions" "goal attainment") as a function of the alternative that is chosen, and (3)the preference ordering among pay-offs. The selection of particular constraints and the rejection of others for incorporation in the model of rational behaviour involves implicit assumptions as to what variables the rational organism "controls"-and hence can "optimize" as means to rational adaptation-and what variables it must take as fixed.

MEANS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION : As various groups compete with each other for their individual group-specific goals, there is continuous struggle and bargaining within the firm. Interestingly, this does not lead to chaos within the firm and firm keeps on performing in stable manner as before.

The reasons for stability can be listed as:

The groups have limited bargaining time and may not be aware/examine all the alternatives open to them. The budget share allotted to each department also acts as a constraint. There may be penalty involved with underutilization or over-utilization of the budget. Past history of goal setting and achieving/not achieving the goals.

Clear delegation of authority also minimizes conflicts. The main means or channels used for conflict resolution are: Cash payments: The managers and workers receive cash salary, owners receive— dividends etc. Incentives: In behavioural theory incentives imply side

payments (like funding a_{\neg} research project, if a scientist within the firm needs to be incentivized).

Slack payments: Organizational slack consists in payments to the members of thecoalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization. According to behavioural theory, this slack may be earned by every group. The managers may receive it in form of fancy offices and cars, workers may receive in in form of wages higher than market wages, customers may receive it in terms of discounts and shareholders may receive it in terms of higher dividends. All this is possible only if business period is favourable (so that sufficient surplus is generated), and there is sufficient time lag available between aspirations. Sequential attention to demand: The most important aspect of conflict resolution is- sequential attention to demand i.e., demands of various groups be met priority wise. In peek production period, production department will get priority; but if focus is on sale/market share, the priority may change accordingly.

DECISION-MAKING AT TOP MANAGEMENT LEVEL : Budget allocation according to bargaining skills. Three things are taken into consideration while allotting the budget Goals of the firm

Availability of resources

 Bargaining skills of head of each department Though, top management does keep some funds aside. These funds can be used at its own discretion at any stage as per requirement.

-The decisions by top management are based on bounded rationality. Complete information may not be sought (as information is not free). Collecting information about all

the alternatives can be uneconomical time-wise too. As no detailed costbenefit analysis is undertaken, one can conclude that top management acts in 'limited' rational way. Information is generally searched only if some problem is there. Here, the concept of position bias comes in the fore. The desire of various managers for security and power in the organization leads to this bias. Just to show importance of their demand, they may overstate the requirements and this may eventually lead to an upward bias in the cost structure of the firm. Furthermore, information may be distorted or under-reported.

DECISION-MAKING AT LOWER MANAGEMENT LEVEL: The day to day routine decisions are taken in a simplified manner by the established norms and rules within the firm. The administrative staff follows the principle of 'learning-by-doing' and learns from past successes and mistakes. Failed methods are not repeated.

UNCERTAINITIES FACED BY FIRM: Cyert and March explain two types of uncertainties faced by a firm, (1) The market uncertainty and (2) the uncertainty about competitors' reaction. The market uncertainty can be partly avoided by collecting information. Because of market uncertainty, firm mainly depends on short term decisions and avoids long term decisions. Interestingly, in terms of uncertainty arising because of oligopolistic interdependence, the behavioural theory chooses to be quiet by assuming 'tacit collusion' among existing firms.